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MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE - PowER oF CouRT TO MoDIFY DECREE FOR ALIMONY OR PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AS AFFECTED BY
AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES - Contracts settling the property interests of a husband and wife or providing for support of the wife or for
both of these ends are no doubt valid in all jurisdictions where the
parties may contract with each other if the purpose is not to facilitate
divorce or future separation.1 Even at common law, separation agreements could be made, however, through the intervention of a trustee. 2
If not invalid, the contract may ordinarily be enforced in an action on
the promise. But, when a divorce is decreed, it is quite often the practice
to incorporate in the divorce decree the provisions of the contract providing for the alimony or support payments, and sometimes property
settlement provisions as well. One advantage to the party in whose favor
the obligation to pay support money runs is the rapidity and efficiency
of contempt proceedings to enforce the decree based on the contract.
Often, however, a later change in the circumstances of the parties renders a change in the agreement and decree desirable. Similarly, one of
the parties may fear the use of contempt proceedings and seek modifica56 Davis, "Revolution in the Supreme Court," 166 A'I'.I. ANTIC MONTHLY 85 at
95 (_1940). Likewise, the principle so often applied by the Court of presuming the
constitutionality of a statute should, in doubtful cases such as that under discussion,
prevail. Justice Murphy, however, indicates that any enactments by legislatures concerning cases of this type will be subjected to close scrutiny by the Court. See Thornhill
v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 at 106, 60 S. Ct. 736 (1940).
51 48 YALE L. J. 308 (1938).

l. See 6 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev. ed., § 1743 (1938). In Hammerstein v.
Equitable Trust Co., 156 App. Div. 644 at 649, 141 N. Y. S. 1065 (1913), it was
said, "In matrimonial actions, brought in good faith, the parties may relieve the court
by agreement . • . of the duty of fixing an amount of alimony. Such an agreement,
openly made and submitted to the court, is not against the policy of the law but is in
confc;,rmity with the general rule which favors ending litigation by agreement where
possible."
·
2 Galusha v. Galusha, 116 N. Y. 635, 22 N. E. 114 (1889).
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tion in order to eliminate that danger.3 The question of the court's
power to modify the decree despite the contract incorporated therein
or adopted as the basis of the decree then becomes crucial. Moreover,
it is important to know whether the modification when granted will
vary only the scope of the obligation enforceable by contempt, or will
actually alter the entire obligation arising from either contract or decree
or both.
In seeking an answer to these questions it seems advisable to consider, first, the authority generally conferred by statutes upon courts
in respect to alimony decrees and property settlements. This is necessary because of the legislative nature of divorce and divorce courts.
Then, it is proposed to survey briefly some of the theories and distinctions which have been utilized by the courts, before attempting an
evaluation of the problems involved and before attempting an answer
to the general questions on the power to modify an alimony decree
based on agreement and the e:ffect of modification.
I.

It may be said to be generally true that the court entering the decree
has power to modify the decree, even though based upon an agreement
of the parties.4 However, the statutory powers of the court having
cognizance of a divorce action are so varied that it is impossible to
suggest the rationale of the varied lines of authority without having
some regard, at least, to such general questions as: (I) Has the court
power to modify a decree of alimony not based upon agreement?
( 2) Has the court power to order a disposition of the property of the
parties? and (3) If so, can it later vary that disposition?
In some thirty-five of the American jurisdictions there are statutory
provisions authorizing the modification of a decree for alimony. 5 In
others the decree may be modified when there has been a retention of
jurisdiction by the court in the decree. 6 In still others the decree may be
modified regardless of reservation or statute, upon the theory that
alimony is in its nature not a final thing. 7 Assuming that the power
3

See, e.g., Goldman v. Goldman, 282 N. Y. 296, 26 N. E. {2d) 265 (1940),
and the cases cited in succeeding notes, which illustrate many of the reasons prompting
the applications for modification.
4
Worthington v. Worthington, 224 Ala. 237, 139 So. 334 (1932); Canary v.
Canary, 89 Colo. 483, 3 P. {2d) 802 (1931); Eddy v. Eddy, 264 Mich. 328, 249
N. W. 868 (1933); Wilson v. Caswell, 272 Mass. 297, 172 N. E. 251 (1930); and
see annotations, 58 A. L. R. 639 (1929), and 109 A. L. R. 1068 (1937).
5
2 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAws, § 106 (1931), and 1938 Supp.
6
E.g., Ohio, Folz v. Folz, 42 Ohio App. 135, 181 N. E. 658 (1932) (reservation became part of agreement of parties and permitted modification).
7
E.g., Emerson v. Emerson, 120 Md. 584, 87 A. 1033 (1913); Alexander
v. Alexander, 13 App. D. C. 334 (1898); see note 71 A. L. R. 723 (1931).
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to modify a decree for alimony exists, it still does not follow that a court
may modify its disposition of the property of the parties. Indeed, it is
only in about half of the jurisdictions of the United States that any
power exists in the court to make a property settlement with any degree
of discretion and in fifteen the court may divide the property of the
parties as it thinks just without reference to the title. 8 In two of the
states, North Dakota and Iowa, the power of the courts to modify or
change property dispositions is conferred by the statutes.9 Independently of such provisions as these, probably modification would not be
permitted past term time, or whatever analogous period is allowed by
statute, since it is supposed that ordinarily property dispositions are
intended to be final, and as a matter of practical convenience should be.
2.

With this general picture of the statutes in mind, it seems desirable
to survey briefly some of the theories and distinctions suggested in the
adjudicated cases in which the power of a court to modify a decree
based upon agreement was considered. Assuming that without the
agreement the court would have power to change its decree,.the basic
problem presented is in the conflict of two opposing ideas. On the one
hand, it may be said that th.e parties, having made a contract, admittedly
valid and admittedly fair when made, should be held to that contract,
and the fact that the alimony decree is based upon the contract does not
matter. On the other hand is the consideration that in fact the agreement has been made the basis of a decree which is not distinguishable
in its other consequences from those of an ordinary decree for alimony 10
and that the parties cannot by contract alter the power of the court to
modify its decrees.
Without attempting to decide between these conflicting arguments,
it seems desirable to consider some of the solutions offered to the problem presented.
According to the force of the fair contract idea, it has been held that
V?"here the agreement is a contract and not a mere stipulation made in
the course of trial the court will not subsequently modify the contract,11
2 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAws, § 96 (1931) and 1938 Supp.
lowa Code (1939), §§ 10481, 10483; N. D. Comp. Laws (1913), § 4405.
10 Note that if there are property settlement provisions in the decree, it may be
distinguishable from the ordinary consequences of a decree in that it may not be
enforced by contempt in sqme jurisdictions. Schnitzer v. Buerger, 237 App. Div. 622,
262 N. Y. S. 385 (1933).
11. Henderson v. Henderson, 37 Ore. 141, 60 P. 597, 61 P. 136 (1900); Law
v. Law, 64 Ohio St. 369, 60 N. E. 560 (1901); Connolly v. Connolly, 16 Ohio
App. 92 (1922) [cf. Folz v. Folz, 42 Ohio App. 135, 181 N. E. 658 (1932), where
there was a reservation of control which became part of the agreement]; Stanfield v.
Stanfield, 22 Okla. 574, 98 P. 334 (1908); Ettlinger v. Ettlinger, 3 Cal. (2d) 172,
8

9
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save of course for equitable grounds such as fraud, duress, mistake, or
the like. 12 The desirability of this approach depends almost entirely
upon the force which is to be given to the argument against impairing
the contract, fairly made by the parties and approved by the court in
the decree.
Another approach, giving weight to the arguments both for and
against modification, solves the problem of modification by distinguishing between contracts providing for alimony or support, and those providing for property settlements. Alimony or support provisions may
be modified when incorporated into the decree, property settlement
provisions may not be. 18 It will be seen that this solution channelizes the
operation of the decree. In regard to alimony provisions, it is to be
treated like any other decree, for the courts are not to be ousted of their
powers by the mere existence of a contract upon which the decree is
based. 14 On the other hand, much may be said for the different result
reached in the property settlement case. In the first place, independently of agreement the court would have no power to make property
provisions in many jurisdictions. Consequently, property settlements
can hardly be said to be within the operation of statutes empowering
courts to make decrees for alimony. Similarly, even if the power exists
44 P. (2d) 540 (1935); Hargis v. Hargis, 252 Ky. 198, 66 S. W. (2d) 59 (1933)
[cf. Boehmer v. Boehmer, 259 Ky. 69, 82 S. W. (2d) 199 (1935), where there
was a retention of control by reservation]. See also annotations 58 A. L. R. ( I 929),
109 A. L. R. 1068 (1937). In Oregon there is a statutory power to modify alimony
decrees, and also in California. In Ohio, Oklahoma and Kentucky there seem to be no
such provisions. See note 5, supra.
12 This exception should be kept in mind in all of the statements made regarding
the lack of power to modify. As to whether it should be modified in equity or in the
divorce court, see Smith v. Smith, 3 34 Ill. 3 70, 166 N. E. 8 5 ( 1929).
13 Goldfish v. Goldfish, 193 App. Div. 686, 184 N. Y. S. 512 (1920), affd.
230 N. Y. 606, 130 N. E. 912 (1921); North v. North, 339 Mo. 1226, 100 S. W.
(2d) 582 (1936) (statute permits modification of alimony award, see note 6, supra);
Joachim v. Joachim, 267 Ill. App. 237 (1932) (statute permits modification of alimony). Compare Johnson v. Johnson, 104 Cal. App. 283, 285 P. 902 (1930), with
Ettlinger v. Ettlinger, 3 Cal. (2d) 172, 44 P. (2d) 540 (1935), where a property
settlement by agreement incorporated into the decree of separation was held not
modifiable. The distinction is also indicated by a comparison of Henderson v. Henderson, 37Ore. 141, 60 P. 597, 61 P. 136 (1900), with Phy v. Phy, u6 Ore. 31,236
P. 751, 240 P. 237 (1925) (alimony provisions may be modified if not made in
consideration of restitution of property brought to the husband by the wife or a
partition of property accumulations). Accord, Simpson v. Simpson, 154 Ore. 396,
60 P. (2d) 936 (1936). To somewhat the same effect is Biggs v. Biggs, II7 W. Va.
431, 185 S. E. 857 (1936) (alimony may be modified but not reduced beyond the
extent husband's contractual promise is based on valuable consideration).
14 Oakes v. Oakes, 266 Mass. 150, 165 N. E. 17 (1929); Wallace v. Wallace,
74 N. H. 256, 67 A. 580 (1907); Eddy v. Eddy, 264 Mich. 328, 249 N. W. 868
(1933).
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to make such provisions, ordinarily there is no provision for subsequent
alteration of the settlement once made. Indeed, if the court may be
said to have retained jurisdiction of the cause so that it has power independently of statute to modify decrees, still ordinarily practical
convenience and the intention of the parties would seem to make for
finality in property dispositions as opposed to continuing payments for
support. This consideration applies, of course, whether there is power
to make property dispositions or not and whether there is an agreement
or not. If there is no power to make a property settlement independently of agreement, the reasoning suggested in the case of Johnson v.
Johnson 15 by the California court indicates an additional objection to
the allowance of modification of property provisions. There it was suggested that even an alimony decree might not be modified where it was
in favor of the guilty party and where the court would have had no
power to award alimony to the guilty party independently of the
contract. The distinction between property and alimony agreements
has, then, the great virtue that it is in accord with the usual statutory
schemes for adjustment and settlement of the obligations of the marital
status upon divorce. The difficulty is the drawing of the line between
provisions for alimony for support and provisions for settlement of
property interests.16
One theory upon which the difficult task of distinguishing between
provisions for settlement of property interests may be eliminated is that
of merger.17 An ordinary contractual obligation is often said to merge
15 104 Cal. App. 283, 285 P. 902 (1930). The trouble with the result of this
decision is that the innocent husband is given no relief because he is innocent, though
relief might have been given if the husband were the guilty party. The equities would
seem to me to demand that the guilty party be estopped from raising the objection.
Further, the analogy to merger of a contract in judgment becomes ever closer where
the contract is the sole authority for the decree.
16 A consideration of the cases cited in note l 3, supra, will indicate something
of the difficulties. It is supposed that among the considerations would be the manner
of payment, the question whether the liability was supported by consideration other
than a forebearance to demand alimony or was supported by property exchanges,
whether there was any indication that the money was to be used for support, etc. The
question what provisions are for support and what for settlement of property interests
would depend, it seems, upon the facts of each agreement.
17 This theory is most clearly announced in Worthington v. Worthington, 224
Ala. 237, 139 So. 334 (1932); Adams v. Adams, 229 Ala. 588, 159 So. So (1934);
Lewis v. Lewis, 53 Nev. 398? 2 P. {2d) 131 (1931); and 9anary v. Canary, 89
Colo. 483, 3 P. {2d) 802 (1931). In the last case the agreement seems to have been
a property settlement, but modification was allowed, though in Colorado there are
no clear statutory provisions permitting a property settlement to be modified. Merger
is also found in other cases either explicitly with reference to alimony, or impliedly.
So, Joachim v. Joachim, 267 Ill. App. 237 (1932) [cf. Smith v. Smith, 334 Ill. 370,
166 N. E. 85 (1929) (contract may be attacked only in equity for fraud-evidently
0
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in the obligation created by a judgment.18 Upon this analogy, it is said
that the contract of the parties, which is incorporated into the decree
and which the court orders the party against whom the decree is rendered to perform, merges in the decree. The decrees of the court being
ordinarily subject to subsequent modification, this decree may likewise
be modified and because the contract has merged in the decree there is
no alteration or impairment of the contractual obligation. If strictly
adhered to, the doctrine of merger would lead to the conclusion that
all portions of the decree may be modified, be they provisions for
property settlement or for support. 19 This would involve a rejection
of the idea that property settlements are ordinarily intended as final,
would disregard the fact that the court can generally make no property
dispositions independently of agreement, nor modify dispositions once
made, even where it possesses the power to make property settlement;
and, of course, if carried to its logical conclusion, the merger theory
completely evades the argument against alteration of a contract fairly
made by the parties and constitutes a rejection of whatever policy
arguments there may be against modification of all or part of the
agreement.
At this point some light on the questions of policy involved may
be gained by a consideration of the approach indicated in the New York
decisions. The highly important question of the effect of the modification of the decree upon the contractual obligation has been previously mentioned. Similarly it is apparent that generally courts have
accepted the necessity for facing one horn of a dilemma; i.e., they have
considered either that both the decree and contract are changeable or
that neither is changeable. The New York cases, however, have developed a highly logical reconciliation of these two points by holding
not completely merged at any rate)]; Nicolls v. Nicolls, 211 Iowa l 193, 235 N. W.
288 ( 193 l) (in dealing with Iowa cases it should be remembered that in Iowa property
settlements may not only be made by the court, but also may be modified, see note 9,
supr~); Oakes v. Oakes, 266 Mass. 150, 165 N. E. 17 (1929); Wilson v. Caswell, 272
Mass. 297, 172 N. E. 251 (1930); Skinner v. Skinner, 205 Mich. 243, 171 N. W.
383 (1919); Eddy v. Eddy, 264 Mich. 328, 249 N. W. 868 (1933); Blake v. Blake,
75 Wis. 339, 43 N. W. 144 {1889); Warren v. Warren, 116 Minn. 458, 133 N. W.
1009 (1912); Wallace v. Wallace, 74 N. H. 256, 67 A. 28 (1907); Le Beau v. Le
Beau1 80 N. H. 139, 114 A. 28 (1921); Herrick v. Herrick, 319 Ill. 146, 149 N. E.
820 (1925), affirming 236 Ill. App. 478 (1925). These·last cases tend to emphasize
the argument that the court may not be ousted of its jurisdiction, but, unlike New
York decisions such as Goldman v. Goldman, 282 N. Y. 296, 26 N. E. (2d) 265
( l 940), there is no intimation that the contractual obligation may be independent of
the decree as modified. Thus, it seems proper to consider them as primarily predicated
on a merger theory.
18 2 FREEMAN, JuoGEMENTS, 5th ed., § 546 (1925).
19 Canaryv. Canary, 89 Colo. 483, 3 P. (2d) 802 (1931) (property settlement
provisions may be modified).
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the decree alterable, but refusing to hold that the contract is changed
by alteration of the decree. This interesting development seems to
have resulted from the fact that the basic approach of the New York
courts has been from the enforcement aspect of the decree. In many
of the New York cases attention is called to the fact that the party
seeking modification fears primarily the use of contempt proceedings
to enforce the contract incorporated into the decree. 20 This factor is
quite evident in a recent court of appeals decision 21 in which modification of the decree was allowed although the decree was based upon ·
contract. No holding was made on the question of the rights of the
parties on the contract. In Kunker v. Kunker 22 it had been held, previously, that the power of the court to modify its decrees could not be
limited by a contract of the parties, again with the same refusal to pass
on the question of the tights of the parties on the contract. Similarly in
Schnitzer v. Buerger23 the appellate division had said that the property
settlement provisions of the contract could not be the basis of contempt
proceedings and as a matter of practice should not be incorpo;ated in
the decree, while alimony provisions of the contract might be modified.
If it is improper to incorporate the property settlement provisions in
the decree, and if contempt proceedings cannot be used to enforce those
provisions, it seems clear that subsequent modification of a property
settlement so incorporated cannot be had. In New York, then, as held
by the recent case of Goldman v. Goldman,24 property settlement
contracts do not merge in the decree. Likewise, the alimony provisions
can hardly be said to merge either, for the courts, both appellate division and court of appeals, have consistently refused to pass upon
20 See Goldfish v. Goldfish, 193 App. Div. 686, 184 N. Y. S. 512 (1920),
affd. 230 N. Y. 606, 130 N. E. 912 (1921); Kunker v. Kunker, 230 App. Div. 641,
246 N. Y. S. 118 (1930); Staehr v. Staehr, 237 App. Div. 843, 261 N. Y. S. 103
(1932); Schnitzer v. Buerger, 237 App. Div. 622, 262 N. Y. S. 385 (1933).
21 Goldman v. Goldman, 282 N. Y. 296, 26 N. E. (2d) 265 (1940).
22 230 App. Div. 641, 246 N. Y. S. 118 (1930). Two recent taxation cases
involved taxability of the income from a trust set up by separation agreement incor. porated in a decree. One of them, Helvering v. Fitch, 309 U. S. 149, 60 S. Ct. 427
(1940), involved Iowa law, the other, Helvering v. Leonard, 310 U.S. 80, 60 S. Ct.
780 (1940), New York law. The latter case seems to disregard the possibility that in
New York the only effect of modification of the decree is to vary the scope of contempt proceedings, leaving contractual obligations enforceable in an action on the
contract. Probably, however, this would not alter taxability of the income to the
grantor, since the property provisions of the trust are subject to change for different
considerations than ordinary contracts. See Hamlin v. Hamlin, 224 App. Div. 168,
230 N. Y. S. 51 (1928) and cases cited infra, note 34. The subject is discussed in
38 M1cH. L. REv. 1285 (1940).
28 237 App. Div. 622, 262 N. Y. S. 385 (1933).
24 282 N. Y. 296, 26 N. E. (2d) 265 (1940). Accord: Schnitzer v. Buerger,
237 App. Div. 622, 262 N. Y. S. 385 (1933).
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whether the parties still have a right• of action for breach of the contract.25 The Goldman case, as the last decision of the court of appeals,
leaves us, therefore, with modification permitted, despite a contract,
so as to alter the obligation for which contempt process may be used
as a method of enforcement; remedy upon the contract remains unless
it may be said that the contract was intended to end at the rendering
of the decree. 26 Somewhat this same idea has been indicated in West
Virginia.2 7 Viewed broadly, the New York suggestion, so logically
irreproachable in going between the horns of the dilemma, seems desirable in denying contempt sanctions for enforcement of the property
provisions and in allowing the scope of the alimony obligation enforceable by contempt to be modified. However, whether the allowance of
an action on the contract, after modification of the decree, is desirable
seems open to question.

3.
Up to this point it has been sought to_ suggest first, the general
statutory and common-law picture of the power of a court to modify
its alimony decrees, second, the power to make and modify property
settlements between the parties to a divorce action, and third, some of
the distinctions and reasoning used in cases where the decree was based
upon an agreement of the parties. No attempt has been made to define
what constitutes incorporation into the decree, 28 nor to distinguish
25 See cases cited supra, notes 20 to 23. See also comment in 6 N. Y. UNiv. L.
REV. 295 (1929).
26 This was intimated in the Goldman case as a possibility; otherwise it seems
assumed that the contract may be enforced in an action upon the promise. Goldman v.
Goldman, 282 N. Y. 296, 26 N. E. (2d) 265 at 269 (1940). Similarly, Staehr v.
Staehr, 237 App. Div. 843, 261 N. Y. S. 103 (1933).
27 In Biggs v. Biggs, 117 W. Va. 431, 185 S. E. 857 (1936), it was said that
the decree might be changed only to the extent that the husband's promise was not
based upon valuable consideration. The same sort of refusal to allow diminution of the
agreement provisions that are based upon restitution of whatever property the wife may
have brought to the husband or upon partition of property provisions is found by way
of dicta in Simpson v. Simpson, 154 Ore. 396, 60 P. (2d) 936 (1936). Thus, it seems
that the obligation of the contract is not to be altered by modification beyond limits but
may be up to those limits. The New York position is more sweeping, of course, since
the entire decree may be altered as to alimony or support provisions; but note that a
greater right on the contract is presumably possible in New York than in West Virginia
or Oregon. Another similarity to the New York rule in regard to property settlements
is found in Moore v. Crutchfield, 136 Va. 20, 116 S. E. 482 (1923) (no jurisdiction
to enforce compliance with contract for property settlements by contempt or to modify
later).
28 See, for examples of what constitutes incorporation, Oakes v. Oakes, 266 Mass.
I 50, l 6 5 N. E. l 7 ( 1929) ( order to pay alimony in accordance with the agreement on
file); Erickson v. Erickson, 181 Minn. 421, 232 N. W. 793 (1930); cf. Armstrong
v. Armstrong, 132 Cal. App. 609, 23 P. (2d) 50 (1933) (not incorporated, though
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between provisions for alimony and provisions constituting a property
settlement. 29 It is conceived that the basic questions in regard to the
power of a court to modify decrees for alimony which are based upon
a contract cannot be solved by definition, and it is thought that the
solution should lie in an evaluation of the ends which will be accomplished by the various theories and their social desirability.
In the first place, should the fact that there is incorporated into the
decree a contract of the parties as to support alter the power of the
court over such decree? Assuming that the court has power by statute
to modify a decree not based on contract, it would seem that in the
view of most courts there is no sufficient reason to take the decree based
on contract out of the operation of the statute as to the alimony provisions. That the interest of the state in the marital status and the dissolution thereof is sufficient reason to support such a view hardly seems to
require demonstration. Somewhat more difficulty is presented if there
is no statutory authority for modification of a decree for alimony. But,
assuming that the court has, independently of statute, power generally
to modify decrees for alimony in a proper case by reservation or otherwise, it is thought that again the same result should ensue. 30 The obligation to pay alimony or support money to a divorced wife is one
peculiarly justified by considerations of social desirability and generally
prescribed as a consequence to dissolution of the marital relation. Being
a continuing obligation, and being subject to scrutiny of the courts as
to fairness and adequacy at its inception, it should so remain and the
contract of the parties should not be allowed to oust the court of power
otherwise exerciseable.31 Further, it must be remembered that the alimony obligation of the contract has become enforceable by contempt
process due to incorporation in the decree and there seem to be strong
reasons why such a drastic sanction should not be available without
power in the court to regulate the extent of the obligation for whose
enforcement the sanctions may be used.
The solution indicated in the New York decisions accords with the
policy last suggested. But it leaves unanswered the more important
question whether the court should have power to modify the entire
obligation. If the parties are still bound under the contract, presumably
contained in complaint, but not referred to in the decree). See also Nelson v. Vassenden,
II5 Minn. 1, 131 N. W. 794 (19n). If the policy reasons here suggested are sound,
perhaps there should be no worry as to incorporation.
29 For examples of agreements held not to be for alimony, see Dickey v. Dickey,
154 Md. 675, 141 A. 387 (1928); Newbold v. Newbold, 133 Md. 170, 104 A.
366 (1918); Emerson v. Emerson, 120 Md. 584, 87 A. 1033 (1913); North v.
North, 339 Mo. 1226, 100 S. W. (2d) 582 (1936); Moore v. Crutchfield, 136 Va.
20, II 6 S. E. 48 2 ( l 92 3). See also note l 6, supra.
so Accord: Folz v. Folz, 42 Ohio App. 135, 181 N. E. 658 (1932).
31 See cases cited supra, note 14.
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it is still enforceable by an action thereon, although it may no longer be
enforced by contempt proceedings. To hold that the contractual rights
of the parties survive the decree seems to leave the party in whose
favor modification was ordered in substantially the same position as
before. Instead of the deep blue sea of contempt process, he is confronted with the devil of sheriff's sale. If it be conceded that justice
demands modification of the agreement in any particular case, then
it seems that the deserving party should be relieved not merely from
the duty of paying under pain of contempt but from the duty of paying
at all. The contractual obligation to pay support money may, therefore,
properly be considered as having merged in the decree, since otherwise the substance of the court's power to prescribe the alimony to be
paid is substantially limited by the contract of the parties. 32
Having concluded that merger should result as to alimony provisions, it by no means follows that the provisions for property settlement should follow the same course. If a court has no power to decree
a property settlement at all, it is rather difficult to consider an agreement to have merged in the decree. 33 The want of power to render such
a decree without agreement would tend to show that the interest of
the state in such matters is thought to be satisfactorily disposed without
judicial interferences. Further, property settlements are ordinarily
intended to be final and complete. Likewise, considerable practical
convenience results if the property dispositions are final. These latter
objections would, it seems, also apply if there is even a broad statutory
power to make property dispositions in the divorce action. Consequently, unless there is a general power both to make and subsequently
to change property dispositions, the decree based upon an agreement
of the parties should not be subject to subsequent modification except,
of course, for reasons which would justify modification of decrees generally or for equitable reasons looking toward rescission or reformation.
It is obvious that the conclusions suggested above are based to a
large extent upon the statutory powers of the courts in a divorce action.
Since legislative authority is necessary for divorce at all by judicial
action, it seems proper that the consequences of a divorce decree should
be largely determined in relation to the particular statutory scheme in
, each jurisdiction. While it is no doubt true that in practice the parties
are generally allowed to determine their rights by agreement, still there
seems to be no sound reason why the agreements should be held by the
courts to limit the scope of the statutory powers of the courts in divorce
32

note

See comment 6 N. Y. UNiv. L. REv. 295 (1929), and cases cited supra,

I 7.

33 For if the court has no power to render the decree, how can it have any effect?
See Schnitzer v. Buerger, 237 App. Div. 622, 262 N. Y. S. 385 (1933), and Johnson
,•. Johnson, 104 Cal. App. 283, 285 P. 902 (1930).

130

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 39

actions. 34 Arguments regarding the impairment of the obligations of a
contract do not seem exactly in point. It must first be determined
whether the parties may be allowed to create obligations, by contract,
which cannot be modified under a statutory power or reservation of
jurisdiction to determine the adequacy and propriety of the arrangements both present and future. Whenever, then, there exists a general
power in the courts to make and modify either alimony or property
provisions or both, it seems to the writer that there are sound reasons
why the parties should not be allowed to limit the powers of the court
by merely securing incorporation of the agreement in the decree.35

Roy L. Rogers

34 See Hammerstein v. Equitable Trust Co., 156 App. Div. 644, 141, N. Y. S.
1065 (1913),' quoted in note 1, supra; Wilson v. Caswell, 272 Mass. 297, 172 N. E.
251 (1930).
· In this connection it may be mentioned that it is an interesting point as to what
authority the two Galusha cases, 116 N. Y. 635, 22 N. E. 1u4 (1889), supra, note
2, and 138 N. Y. 272, 33 N. E. 1062 (1893), still have in New York. In the
Goldman case it was said that their authority was unimpaired, Goldman v. Goldman,
282 N. Y. 296, 26 N. E. (2d) 265 (1940). But, in view of that decision and the
language in cases such as the Hammerstein case, supra, it may be doubted that a separatio~ agreement is still binding upon the court as to its allowance for alimony. See
Harding v. Harding, 203 App. Div. 721, 197 N. Y. S. 78 (1922). At any rate,
under the Galusha cases the agreement was only binding if fair when made, and these
cases seem to establish that it may be modified for changed circumstances contrary to
dicta in the first Galusha case, while the second Galusha case admitted modification
for fraud.
35 One more point should be noticed. In many states there seems to be no power
to make a property settlement. In this situation, not only does it seem that the property
settlement agreement should not merge in the decree so as to permit alteration under
a general power to modify alimony provisions, but it also seems doubtful that contempt
proceedings should be available for enforcement of the property provisions. Besides the
New York cases discussed in the text, see cases cited note 27, supra.

